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Abstract
Background: Poor diet is the leading preventable risk factor contributing to the burden of disease in Australia. A
range of cost-effective, comprehensive population-focussed strategies are available to address these dietary-related
diseases. However, despite evidence of their effectiveness, minimal federal resources are directed to this area. To
better understand the limited public health nutrition policy action in Australia, we sought to identify the key policy
brokers in the Australian nutrition policy network and consider their level of influence over nutrition policymaking.
Methods: A social network analysis involving four rounds of data collection was undertaken using a modified
reputational snowball method to identify the nutrition policy network of individuals in direct contact with each
other. Centrality measures, in particular betweenness centrality, and a visualisation of the network were used to
identify key policy brokers.
Results: Three hundred and ninety (390) individual actors with 1917 direct ties were identified within the Australian
nutrition policy network. The network revealed two key brokers; a Nutrition Academic and a General Health
professional from a non-government organisation (NGO), with the latter being in the greatest strategic position for
influencing policymakers.
Conclusion: The results of this social network analysis illustrate there are two dominant brokers within the nutrition
policy network in Australia. However their structural position in the network means their brokerage roles have
different purposes and different levels of influence on policymaking. The results suggest that brokerage in isolation
may not adequately represent influence in nutrition policy in Australia. Other factors, such as direct access to
decision–makers and the saliency of the solution, must also be considered.
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Background
Poor diet is the leading preventable risk factor contribut-
ing to the burden of disease in Australia [1, 2]. A range
of cost-effective, comprehensive population-focussed
strategies are available to address these dietary-related
diseases [3–5]. However, despite evidence of the effect-
iveness, minimal federal resources are directed to this
area in Australia [6]. This lack of action is occurring
within a policy space that is characterised by a range of
diverse interest groups or actors vying to influence
public health nutrition policy, including: many different
sectors of the food and beverage industry; health and
agricultural organisations; national, state and territory
government departments of health; agriculture; trade;
and consumer affairs; academics and popular media
figures. In different ways and for different motives, these
interest groups seek to influence Australian food and
nutrition policy and what Australians eat [7]. To better
understand the limited public health nutrition policy
action in Australia, we examined the power and influ-
ence of the actors involved in the policymaking process.
Power is a contested concept amongst political science
scholars and is often conceptualized in a range of differ-
ent ways, including ideational, structural and relational
[8]. Historically the most common understanding of
power has been relational where power is defined as the
ability to achieve desired results; this can occur through
the utilisation of resources and/or influence over actors
[9]. Actors are powerful if they manage to influence
* Correspondence: k.cullerton@connect.qut.edu.au
1School of Exercise and Nutrition Sciences, Queensland University of
Technology, Victoria Park Rd, Kelvin Grove, QLD 4059, Australia
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
© The Author(s). 2017 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
(http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Cullerton et al. BMC Public Health  (2017) 17:307 
DOI 10.1186/s12889-017-4217-8
outcomes in a way that brings them closer to their ideal
endpoints [8]. However, this can be achieved in a num-
ber of different ways. A traditional view of power and
influence in policymaking is that it comes from the pos-
session of important resources, such as positional power,
for example a Chief Executive Officer, or personal
resources including education level or charisma [10].
The relative possession of these resources is thought to
provide actors with a means of coercion or influence
over others. However, some policy network scholars
believe this traditional view of resource-based power is
limiting, as they believe power is inherently a structural
phenomenon within a network [10–12]. Accordingly, the
authors view power within a policy network as being
built upon relationships between actors and the distance
between actors and their resources.
Policy networks are linkages between government
bodies and other actors involved in public policymaking
[13]. The networks are defined by geographic scope, a
substantive issue and may involve hundreds of active
actors from all levels of government, multiple interest
groups, the media and research institutions [14]. These
actors compete for their specific policy objectives to be
translated into government policy. Some policy networks
are considered “politically charged”, that is, they contain
both allies and adversarial actors vying for pre-eminence
by both enhancing their own position while also poten-
tially subverting another’s outcomes [15]. This is the case
for the nutrition policy network in Australia [16, 17].
Mapping out a policy network using social network
analysis allows for the investigation of sometimes less
obvious or hidden patterns in relationships that tran-
scend hierarchical structure and improve our under-
standing of an actor’s relative power [18]. It has been
used to examine a range of topics areas in health
including community health coalitions [19], physician
collaborations [20], relationships between tobacco con-
trol partners [21] and identifying the most powerful ac-
tors in public health policymaking [22]. A network
consists of ‘ties’ which are patterns of association that
link actors together; they can include informal linkages,
based on communication and trust, as well as links
based on the traditional institutionalized structures of
co-ordination [23]. These connections can determine an
actor’s ability to project power, control information flows
and attempts to influence political outcomes or other ac-
tors [11]. The way an individual is embedded in a policy
network can impose constraints on the individual as well
as offer them opportunities [24]. Opportunities and
potentially influence can be gained by those individuals
who are well-connected to other informed individuals
through their ability to access larger stores of useful pol-
itical information [25]. Those on the periphery of net-
works, whose ties link them mainly to other marginal
individuals, will encounter inadequate quantities and
qualities of information [26]. They are in uninformed,
hence uninfluential, locations.
Within social network analysis a range of different
measures can be employed to explore power and influ-
ence. Centrality measures in general and betweenness
centrality in particular are commonly used to identify in-
fluential individuals within a policy network [18]. Those
with the highest levels of betweenness centrality act as
brokers as they occupy a potentially privileged position
in the networks structure and are often assumed to have
a decisive impact on policy outcomes [27]. Centrality
measures come in many forms including degree,
closeness and betweenness (see Table 1). The concept of
closeness in the Australian nutrition policy network has
been explored by the authors in a previous paper [16].
This paper will explore power gained by being a broker
as well as degree centrality in the Australian nutrition
policy network.
Degree centrality (in-degree and out-degree)
Power and influence can come from various sources
within a network. One measure is how highly nominated
an individual is by others in the network (in-degree). If
an individual receives many nominations or ties (an indi-
cation of a relationship or interactions) from others, they
are said to be prominent or highly visible and this may
indicate their importance [24]. Individuals who are able
to nominate connections with a high number of people
(out-degree) are able to communicate with many others,
or make others aware of their views. However, network
theorists note that simply having many connections is
only one way to be influential [30]. A person with fewer
connections might have more ‘important’ connections
than someone with a large number of connections. One
Table 1 Measures of centrality [24]
Degree: the more ties (direct connections) an actor has, the more power
they (may) have. Actors who have more ties have greater opportunities
because they have more choices.
In-degree: the number of ties that lead into the actor directly from
others, that is, the number of respondents who identified a particular
actor as influential.
Out-degree: the number of ties that lead out of the actor directly to
others, that is, the number of others identified by an individual actor
as influential.
Closeness: If an actor is able to reach other actors at shorter path
lengths, particularly decision-makers they will have greater influence.
This position means power can be exerted by direct bargaining and
exchange. Actors who are able to reach other actors at shorter path
lengths have greater power and capacity to influence.
Betweenness: If an actor lies between other actors, that is, they act as a
‘broker’ that others must go through to reach a different group of
people; they are in a position of power.
For detailed formulae for each of the above-used measures, please refer to
Knoke and Yang (2008) [28] or Wasserman and Faust (1994) [29]
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connection can be more important than another in
different ways and in different contexts. Some connec-
tions are better because they link to well-connected
people [16], whereas others are more important because
they bridge across otherwise separated sections of the
network [30].
Betweenness centrality
Betweenness centrality is a measure that identifies indi-
viduals (brokers) who bridge different parts of the
network. It specifically measures the number of times an
actor is on the shortest path between two other actors
[31]. Betweenness centrality is the most prominent cen-
trality measure used to study power and dominance, be-
cause it indicates an actor’s strategic position as a broker
between other actors in the network, thus enabling the
spread of information [32]. Policy brokers can connect
subsystems when groups differ in their beliefs and
conflict about policy preferences exists [18].
Other actors in the network come to rely on brokers
for indirect access to resources beyond their reach [33].
The broker is pivotal within this configuration and
profits from others’ reliance on them. In turn, the group
that emerges around the broker benefits overall because
the broker extends the group’s opportunities and avail-
able resources [34]. Network analysis has demonstrated
that brokers can have a significant impact on decision-
making and are thus able to shape outcomes decisively
at critical policy junctures [18], hence betweenness
centrality is the primary measure reported in this article.
Methods
A summary of the methods used is provided below; a
more detailed description of the methodology is de-
scribed elsewhere [16]. The aim was to identify those in-
dividuals who occupied structural positions of privilege
in the nutrition policy network in Australia. Privileged
structural positions in a network include those actors
with high centrality, in particular betweenness centrality,
and those with relatively low path distance to decision-
makers (compared to other actors in the network). A
previously used modified reputational snowball method
[35] was undertaken to identify the nutrition policy net-
work of individuals in direct contact with each other.
This process began with asking a seed sample of nine
leaders from diverse backgrounds in the nutrition
policymaking process to ‘list the people you regard as in-
fluential in nutrition policy in Australia’(see Additional
file 1). A definition of influence was provided which re-
quired that those nominated could do one or more of
the following: demonstrate a capacity to shape ideas
about policy; initiate policy proposals; substantially
change or veto other’s proposals; or substantially affect
implementation of policy related to food and nutrition
[35]. Survey participants were required to note whether
they were in direct contact with those they nominated
and how often this direct contact occurred. The lead au-
thor then contacted all the nominees and asked them
the same question. This process occurred for four suc-
cessive rounds as data saturation was reached at this
point.
All names received and their relationships with others
were entered into social network analysis software,
NodeXL [36], for both network visualisation and calcu-
lating centrality measures. Centrality measures were
explored using in-degree (number of nominations an
individual receives from others), out-degree (number of
nominations of others an individual provides) and be-
tweenness centrality (measures the extent an individual
lies on paths between other individuals). A visualisation
of the network was undertaken using the Harel-Koren
Fast Multiscale algorithm with a high level of repulsion
between vertices (repulsion =20) to visualise the network
and emphasise brokerage roles.
Results
Two hundred and eighty three individuals were invited
to participate in the study and 140 responded, providing
a response rate of 49%. The response rates for the differ-
ent professional sectors are provided in Table 2.
Three hundred and ninety (390) individual actors with
1917 direct ties were identified in the nutrition policy
network, with the network density described as relatively
low at a measure of 0.009539 (potential actor relation-
ships: actual actor relationships) and an average geodesic
path distance of 3.29007 (7 maximum). Table 3 high-
lights the top five Brokers ranked by betweenness
centrality, which as discussed above in Methods, is the
lead indicator for power and dominance within the nu-
trition network. Brokers’ degree, in-degree and out-degree
are also reported in Table 3 to provide additional con-
text. Figure 1 presents a visual depiction of the overall
nutrition policy network in Australia, which at a glance
shows academic and government nutrition professionals
congregating closely to Broker 2. Further analysis of the
Table 2 Number of respondents in each profession and
response rates
Profession Number (Response rate %)
Bureaucrat 38 (55)
Academic 38 (57)
Non-Government Organisation 37 (54)
Food Industry 16 (64)
Political 6 (18)
Public figures (celebrities) 2 (25)
Journalists 3 (23)
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direct ties from Broker 2 confirm a higher proportion of
direct ties with nutrition professionals compared to any
other professional group (see Fig. 2). This aggregation of
nutrition professionals around Broker 2 was also con-
firmed as a structural cluster within the network, via a
cluster analysis conducted in a previous interrogation of
the data set (see [16]).
In the present analysis, we find that decision-makers
are predominantly found on the opposite side of this
dense congregation with limited direct ties with the nu-
trition professionals. In the middle of these two groups
and with the highest betweenness centrality (see Table 1)
of all actors in the network is a General Health Profes-
sional from a non-government organisation (NGO). This
person is in a key brokerage role (Broker 1). The authors
acknowledge that the reported betweenness centrality
appears high at face value, but the size of the network,
coupled with relatively low density and modest average
path distance make the resulting betweenness less sur-
prising. To make these reported figures more easily
comparable to other network studies, a column normal-
ising (scaled between zero and one) the reported
Table 3 Betweenness centrality/degree centrality of nutrition policy network









General Health NGO 1 76 25,512 0.3381 49 53
Nutrition Professional Academic 2 77 24,039 0.3185 45 52
Nutrition Professional Government 3 60 13,930 0.1846 19 52
Food Industry 4 40 12,017 0.1592 3 40
General Health Government (decision-maker) 5 30 10,768 0.1427 10 24
Fig. 1 Network Analysis of the overall nutrition policy network in Australia. Key: NGO \ ACADEMIC \ GOVT \ FOOD IND \
DECISION MAKER\ JOURNALIST\POLITICAL. ◇ Public Figure\○ Nutrition Specialist \ □ General Health\△ Private Sector
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betweenness centrality scores is also provided in Table 1,
which further illustrates the prominence of the two
Brokers that are focused on in this paper.
Other actors with high betweenness centrality can be
seen in Table 3. A Nutrition Professional Academic has
the second highest ranking (Broker 2); however, when
examining Fig. 1 you can see this individual is sur-
rounded by the cluster of nutrition professionals. This
indicates Broker 2 is taking on a brokering role amongst
nutrition professionals rather than brokering relations
with decision-makers. The three remaining actors in the
top 5 brokers have much lower betweenness centrality
scores which correlate to their lower in-degree scores.
Discussion
Relationships between policymakers and interest groups
can often occur behind closed doors and are not easily
visible. In this paper we have analysed data from a range
of nominated influential actors that make up the nutri-
tion policy network in Australia. There is a specific focus
on brokers as their structural position is assumed to give
them a decisive impact on policy outcomes.
The network reveals two key brokers with the General
Health NGO broker (referred to as Broker 1) in a much
more prominent (strategic) position for influencing pol-
icymakers, than the Nutrition Professional Academic
broker (Broker 2). The network data demonstrated that
Broker 1 held a commanding position with respect to
network connections and strategic position within the
network that no other actor was able to match. This
position gives this individual more power by allowing
them to better control the flow of important resources
such as information to and from other members of the
network and brokering new relationships which in turn
can set and shape agendas. A potential downside of
actors within centrally located network positions is that
while they can leverage their centrality to link actors
with resources and other constructive relationships
within their network, they also have the capacity to pre-
vent other actors from participating in certain policy-
making decisions or agenda setting decisions [27].
Broker 2 (Nutrition Professional Academic) has a clear
brokering role among nutrition professionals. This is an
important role for ensuring the flow of information be-
tween nutrition professionals in government, academia
and within NGO’s. However, the overall network pos-
ition of Broker 2 is not as close to policy decision-
makers, meaning that it requires greater investment of
time and relational capital for Broker 2 to access and
link information to decision-makers when compared to
Broker 1. So, while Broker 2 is highly prominent within
the policymaking network, Broker 2’s strategic position
is not potentially as effective as that of Broker 1.
Other Brokers listed in Table 2 scored far lower in
betweenness centrality than the top two Brokers. This
dramatically lower betweenness centrality is more a
product of their position in the network (with respect to
the distance from central decision makers) and their
linking to fewer discrete sub-groups in the network (and
subsequently lower degree scores). This translates to a
far lower visibility to others within the nutrition network
for these lower ranked Brokers. This reduced visibility is
further triangulated in the data from the imbalance
between the lower ranked Broker’s in-degree and out-de-
gree. That is, a high out-degree demonstrates the Broker
Fig. 2 Direct ties from Brokers 1 and 2.Key: NGO \ ACADEMIC \ GOVT \ FOOD IND \ DECISION MAKER\
JOURNALIST\POLITICAL. ◇ Public Figure\○ Nutrition Specialist \ □ General Health\△ Private Sector
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identifies themselves as having active relationships with
many others in the network (typically across many
categories of actors), whereas the lower in-degree indi-
cates that few in the network see the Broker as playing
an influential role in the policy making network (i.e. only
seen as influential to particular categories within the net-
work). This highlights the value in the social network
analysis methodology in making the invisible networks
visible. For example, Broker 4, from the food industry,
was well connected with decision-makers yet only one
nutrition professional nominated this person. While
Broker 4 has fewer total connections, they are extremely
well-placed to access and potentially influence decision
makers. Also, a key government decision maker (Broker
5) had very few people in the network nominate them as
an influential direct connection, indicating a lack of
awareness of the importance of this individual in
decision-making or an inability to develop a relationship
with a bureaucrat this senior. This presents an oppor-
tunity for actors to review their network connections
and their position within the policymaking networks to
ensure they remain effective within the network.
At face value, the network pictured in Fig. 1 appears
quite dense, which makes the prominence of Broker 1
and Broker 2, as illustrated by their exceptionally high
betweenness centrality reported in Table 2, appear out of
place. That is, a relatively dense network would typically
have many pathways available for actors to access other
actors in the network. This increased number of path-
ways would normally result in downward pressure on
the betweenness centrality for actors in the network.
However, the relatively low network density (0.009539)
indicates that the network is at least somewhat fragmen-
ted, with a previous analysis of the data [16] confirming
this by identifying several distinct clusters within the over-
all nutrition policy network. Relationships between the
clusters were often mediated by Brokers 1 and 2, helping
to keep the average geodesic path distance (number of
steps to get from one actor to another) down to a modest
3.29007 (maximum of 7). Consequently, Brokers 1 and 2
make it far easier for actors in one area of the network to
access actors in another, hence their extraordinarily high
reported betweenness centrality scores.
The two top-ranked Brokers have extremely high de-
gree centrality (both in and out degree) compared with
the remaining participants. This demonstrates how well-
known these two Brokers are within the nutrition policy
network, as well as how effective they are at linking to
others within the network, compared to the remaining
policy actors. This is a common phenomenon in SNA
known as preferential attachment [32]. Popular actors
often tend to become more popular because they have
high visibility to begin with. This results in degree distri-
butions which are often positively skewed to a small
number of actors with very high degree and many actors
with lower degrees [32].
Of interest, is that, despite Broker 1’s advantageous
brokerage position, the limited number of policy out-
comes for nutrition suggests that the actor, and poten-
tially the network as a whole, has a limited impact on
nutrition policy action at a federal level on Australia.
This may reflect the complexity of nutrition as an issue
or it may reflect the lack of focus on nutrition by Broker
1 due to competing priorities associated with their gen-
eral health role. It may also point to the fact that broker-
age in isolation may not be as influential in nutrition
policy as other network measures such as direct access
to decision makers as discussed in a previous paper by
the authors. By extension, this indicates that a strategic
brokerage position within a decision making network is
not enough to influence policy, and that many other
factors are likely at play including ideology and beliefs of
decision-makers, the salience of the issue, opposing
pressure from the food industry, unsupportive institu-
tional norms and a lack of public will [17, 37, 38].
Furthermore despite the close ties amongst the nutrition
community in Australia, previous studies have shown
that this does not necessarily translate into expert
consensus around nutrition issues [17]. This lack of
consensus hinders the development of strong, advo-
cacy groups and therefore decreases the likelihood of
policy change [14].
Importantly these results show that brokers may per-
form different roles in the network to what some
scholars have traditionally assumed, which is that policy
brokers are synonymous with policy entrepreneurs [33].
Policy entrepreneurs act in an opportunistic and stra-
tegic way to promote their interests so the final outcome
reflects their policy preferences [39]. However, the
current role of the Broker 1 in nutrition policy may be
more in line with the policy broker definition provided
by the Advocacy Coalition Framework [14] where
brokers are seen as actors that seek stability through
connecting interest groups that differ in their beliefs.
In these situations, policy brokers can intervene by
promoting conciliatory policy solutions and by medi-
ating trust [40].
Another important role that brokers hold within policy
networks is to steward policy discussions of the more
discrete actors that fall within their personal network.
Consequently, there is an opportunity for brokers in
nutrition policy to act not only as aggregators and con-
duits of information, but as mentors to their sub-
networks as well. It may be worth considering alternate
ways to support key brokers in the nutrition network or
utilise their strategic position to improve the effective-
ness of nutrition advocacy and/or improve the ability of
more discrete actors to align their efforts in a more
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coordinated way. This could take the form of a broker
mentoring a group of actors to help them develop key
relationships and share the burden of linking discrete
actors with decision-makers. Alternatively a good invest-
ment would be creating more opportunities for estab-
lishing linkages between actors within the network to
provide better visibility of the range of initiatives taken
by actors who would identify as discrete.
Conclusion
This study has added value in terms of understanding
influential actors and power in an environment where
policy is frequently made by a diverse range of actors
whose influence is often derived from access to political
and social capital. The results of this study suggest there
are two dominant brokers of the nutrition policy net-
work in Australia. However their position in the network
means their brokerage roles have different purposes and
different levels of influence for policymaking. In the
highly contested nutrition policy space, many other fac-
tors are likely at play including ideology and beliefs of
decision-makers, unappealing solutions, lack of consen-
sus from the nutrition community, opposing pressure
from the food industry and lack of public will. In
addition, this study has also highlighted that many nutri-
tion advocates are not aware of and do not have direct
links with other key influential individuals. As networks
are not static, there are opportunities for advocates to
change the current network by ensuring advocates for
nutrition policy change move into more advantageous
positions. There is a role for the key brokers to utilise
their position to improve the effectiveness of nutrition
advocacy and/or improve the ability of more discrete ac-
tors to align their efforts in a more coordinated way.
Limitation
This study has certain limitations. Firstly, brokerage is
only one aspect of actor influence in a policy network. As-
pects beyond relationships can impact on policy outcomes
including public will, beliefs and values of decision-
makers, party policy, and media coverage of an issue. In-
corporating qualitative data from key network actors
could provide further insight into power and influence in
nutrition policy. Secondly, this is a cross-sectional design
and therefore limits the ability to infer causality or tem-
porality, and it may also mask potential shifts in power
over time as well as underlying power. If additional re-
sources were available a longitudinal analysis would im-
prove the study. Finally, while the response rate for this
study was high for an elite network of this size, a higher
response rate, particularly from the political sector, would
have provided greater confidence in our data.
Additional file
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